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24 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the Mix case the action had been brought in the federal court in
Missouri it could have been maintained."4 The objection that there
was an interference with interstate commerce is obviously met by
the answer that Congress expressly has given legislative sanction
to it.
Does not the same answer apply to an action in the state courts,
in a state where the defendant is doing business? Sec. 6 gives the
federal courts and the state courts concurrent, i. e., equal, jurisdic-
tion. If the first portion of tho section be construed to be a reg-
ulation of the venue of actions in the federal courts and therefore
inapplicable to the jurisdiction of state courts, still by other valid
federal legislation all the federal district courts are given jurisdic-
tion. 5 The competent courts of all states therefore have jurisdic-
tion, because all federal district courts have jurisdiction.
If the first portion of the section be construed to be a regut-
lation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, then jurisdiction
of the state courts is limited to those states where the parties
are residents, or where the action accrued, or the carrier is doing
business.
In either event it would seem that the Supreme Court could
not re-regulate the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts, but
would be forced to accept the regulation of Congress to the effect
that any competent federal or state court in a state where the car-
rier was doing business has jurisdiction.
BERNAD C. GAVIT.
REcEIVERsHIPS-PRocEss-FoREIGN CoRuo1zTxoNs.-[New
York] In an action begun in New York by a Vermont citizen
against a Vermont corporation for negligence occurring in Vermont
and causing death there the summons was served upon a director
residing in New York. The defendant had been placed in the hands
of receivers in Vermont and the receivership had been extended to
New York under U. S. Jud. Code sec. 56, after the cause of action
arose but before the service of process. The defendant having
moved to set aside the service, held, the motion should be granted.
Gaboury v. Central Vermont Ry. Co.'
The efficiency of post-receivership service of process in suits
arising out of pre-receivership business has but rarely come before
the courts. In the instant case, the court (Cardozo, C. J.) rested
its decision on two grounds: (1) that a foreign corporation which
has been placed in receivership is in the same position as if it had
against removal of causes to the federal courts, if begun in the state courts,
was given unquestioned effect.
14. There can be no question but what the railroad company was "do-
ing business" in Missouri within the meaning of sec. 6. It may have been
doing interstate business exclusively, but the act makes no distinction between
interstate and intrastate business. It requires merely that the defendant be
"doing business" in the district.
15. See supra, notes 10 and 12.
1. (1929) 250 N. Y. 233, 165 N. E. 275.
NOTES
withdrawn from the state, since "presence within the state imports
the use of corporate power by corporate representatives" (p. 237) ;
and (2) that the order appointing receivers, having enjoined the
officers, directors and agents of the company from interfering with
the receivers' possession, had shorn the directors of their representa-
tive capacity. Both grounds seem sound, although the latter only
comes within the purview of authority.2 On the other hand, had the
receivership not been extended to the form, the former ground
might not have been available."
The decision might also have been placed on the ground that
service upon a resident director of a foreign corporation is valid
only when the cause of action arose within the state.4
The case affords another manifestation of the growing con-
sciousness of the courts that their traditional willingness to enforce
foreign law through comity and to recognize rights founded upon
it has begun to be availed of as an instrument of oppression, for it
has given encouragement to a practice on the part of attorneys in
personal injury cases to sue in that forum which has the greatest
capacity of causing inconvenience to the defendant, in order thereby
to add an element of nuisance value as an incentive toward settle-
ment. Suffice it to say that where the defendant upon whom is
thus imposed the hardship of trial in an inconvenient forum, is
engaged in interstate commerce, the practice has been condemned
as a burden on such commerce.5
For an extended exposition of the evil and the remedy, see an
able article by Paxton Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in Anglo-American Law."
E. W. PUTTKAMMER.
SALES-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONDITIONAL PAYMENT-RES-
TITUTION.- [Illinois] In Illinois-Indiana Fair Association v. Phil-
lips' the court held (a) that an agreement to purchase shares of
stock of a corporation was within the Statute of Frauds relating
to the sales of goods or choses in action (sec. 4 Uniform Sales Act) ;
(b) that a promissory note given for the stock by the buyer was
2. In re Hudson River Electric Power Co. (1909) 173 Fed. 934; s. c.(1910) 183 Fed. 701; Barker v. Southern Building and Loan Assn. (1910)
181 Fed. 636; Grasselli Chentical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co. (1918) 252 Fed.
456; City of Rochester v. Bronson (1871) 41 Hpw. (N. Y.) 78; Schipper
Bros. Coal Mining Co. v. Economy Domestic Coal Co. (1923) 277 Pa. St. 356,
121 Atl. 193; Hawes "Jurisdiction of Courts" sec. 235.
3. Howard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. (1897) 11 App. D. C. 300;
Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown (1902) 171 N. Y. 488, 64 N. E. 194.
4. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer (1905) 197
U. S. 407; St. Louis-Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Alexandee (1913) 227 U. S.
218. And see Takacs v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. (1915) 228 Fed. 728.
5. Davis v. Farmers! Cooperative Equity Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43
Sup. Ct. Rep. 556; Michggi; Central R. R. Co. v. Mix' (1929) 278 U. S. 492,
49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.
6. 29 Col. Law Rev. 1.
1. (1927) 328 Ill. 368.
